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MONETARY POLICY PREFERENCES OF INDIVIDUAL FOMC MEMBERS:
A CONTENT ANALYSIS OF THE MEMORANDA OF DISCUSSION
HenryW. Chappell,Jr.,Thomas M. Havrilesky,and Rob Roy McGregor*
Abstract-The

Memoranda of Discussion provide detailed records of

Data availablefor such investigationshave been limited.

FederalOpenMarketCommittee(FOMC)meetingdeliberations.Procedures are developedfor coding the textualdata in the Memorandaand Until 1976, the FOMCrecordeddetailedminutesof meetassessingthe reliabilityof thosecodings.The codingsarethenusedin the ings andpublishedthemaftera five-yearlag as Memoranda
estimationof parametersof individualFOMCmembers'reactionfunc- of Discussion. The Memoranda contained detailed descriptions.Datafromthe 1970to 1976periodareemployedin theestimation.In
the future, similar methods could be used to analyze newly released tionsof conversationsthattookplacein meetingsandlinked
of FOMCmeetingsheld after1976.
transcripts
(paraphrased)statementsto specific individuals.In March

TNRECENTyearsempiricalanalysesof monetarypolicy
makinghave increasinglyfocused on decisionsmade by
individualmembersof the FederalOpenMarketCommittee
(FOMC).1This focus is motivatedby the recognitionthat
members'individualdecisions underliethe policy choices
ultimately selected by the committee, and that members
differ in their innate policy preferences,their political
loyalties, and their responsivenessto external pressures.
Most studiesof individualFOMCmembershave examined
recordsof votes on the monetarypolicy directivesadopted
by the committeeat each of its meetings.While votingdata
areinformative,some differencesof opinionamongFOMC
membersarenot revealedby formalvotingrecords.Once a
monetarypolicy directiveis putto a vote, thereis a tendency
for membersto close ranks,vote approvingly,andpresenta
unitedfrontto externalparties.Giventhe paucityof dissents
and the absence of other informationthat might reveal
differingpreferences,the ability of analyststo distinguish
differingpreferencesacrossindividualsorgroupsof individuals has been limited.
A possibleway to learnmoreaboutthe policypreferences
of individualmembersof the FOMC is by studying the
textualrecordof committeedeliberations.This "narrative"
approachhas recentlygained favor in studiesof monetary
policy making.However,most studieshave not focusedon
the policy preferencesof individualFOMCmembers.2

1976 the Fed announcedthat the Memorandawould be
discontinued,and publicationof detailedrecordsceased. It
appearedthat no detailedrecordsof FOMC deliberations
would exist for subsequentmeetings.However,in October
1993 Federal Reserve Board ChairmanAlan Greenspan
revealedin congressionaltestimonythat FOMCmeetings
held since 1976 had been audiotaped,that these tapes had
been regularlytranscribed,andthatcopies of the transcripts
were being held within the Fed. The Fed subsequently
agreedto releaseeditedversionsof thesetranscripts.3
In this paperwe empiricallyinvestigatethe policy preferences of individualFOMC membersusing data from the
Memoranda of Discussion for the 1970-1976 period, begin-

ning with Arthur Burns' appointmentas chairmanand
ending with the cessation of the Memoranda.4While our
study adds detail to the existing descriptive history of
monetarypolicy makingin this period,ourprimaryfocus is
on describingmethodsfor reliablycodingtextualdatafrom
the Memoranda of Discussion for subsequent use in an

econometricmodel of FOMCdecision making.The literature on content analysis guides us in this effort.5Since
institutionalarrangementsfor the making of monetary
policy have not changeddramaticallysince the 1970s,these
methodswill have continuingapplicabilityin the future,as
newly releasedtranscriptsaremadeavailable.
In sectionI we describethe collectionof ourdataandthe
subsequentassessmentof their reliability.Section II describes our model of FOMC decision making and its
SectionIIIpresentsthe empirical
Received for publication January5, 1994. Revision accepted for empiricalimplementation.
publicationSeptember21, 1995.
results,andconclusionsfollow in sectionIV.
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sources.Theearlyworkof Canterbery
(1967) is theonly previousstudyto
codeindividuals'preferenceson thedirectivebasedon commentsrecorded
as the Memoranda.None of these studies,however,has incorporated
data
gleanedfromtheMemorandaintoa modelof FOMCdecisionmaking.
3By early 1995, the Fed had published transcriptsfor only three
completeyears.
4 This sampleperiodwas chosenfor severalreasons.First,it is the most
recentperiodfor whichthe Memorandaareavailable.Second,the FOMC
adheredclosely to an interest-ratetargetingprocedurein this period.Our
(1991).
modelhasbeendevelopedfor suchan operatingprocedure.Third,in these
2 Woolley(1984) madeuse of the FOMC'sMemoranda
of Discussionto years, the discussion of the committee was usually guided by the
providea narrativeof policy makingfor 1972, and Romerand Romer alternativepolicy scenariospresentedby the Fed staff.This facilitatesthe
(1989, 1994)haveused the Memorandato help identifyperiodswhenthe codingof members'preferences.
5 Discussions of the nature and techniquesof content analysis are
Fed intentionallyshifted towarddisinflationaryor expansionarypolicy
stances.BoschenandMills (1995) use the Recordof Policy Actionsand presentedby Holsti (1969), Krippendorff(1980), and Weber (1985).
the Memorandato derive an indicatorof monetarypolicy which they Applicationsof contentanalysisin politicalscienceincludePadgett(1982)
compare with indicatorsderived by other researchersfrom the same andMosley(1984).
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I.

A Content Analysis of the Memoranda of Discussion

In each meeting of the FOMC, a monetary policy
directiveis selected by majorityvote. Priorto voting on a
policy directive,memberscustomarilyexpress their individual preferencesin the "policy go-around."Discussion
usuallycenterson members'views of policy scenariosthat
havebeenpresentedby theboard'sstaff.Afterthe discussion
is completed,the chairman(or a memberdesignatedby the
chairman)proposesa directiveto be voted up or down, and
the formalvote follows. In practice,directivesareproposed
only whenmajoritysupportis assured.
Members can then cast either assenting or dissenting
votes. It is customaryto providean explanationfor dissents,
which can almost always be characterizedas "favoring
ease" or "favoringtightness."6As we have noted,members
who ultimatelyassentoftengive someindicationof dissatisfaction with the adopteddirectiveduringthe course of the
meeting.In ourcodingof the Memoranda we will therefore
distinguish three categories of assents: assents "leaning
towardease,"assents"leaningtowardtightness,"and "pure
assents."In oursampleperiodtherewere76 meetingsof the
FOMC, which produced804 individualvotes, excluding
thoseof the chairman.7
Ourcodingtaskis to classifyeachof
those votes into one of the five categoriesdescribedabove
(dissentsfor ease or tightness,leans for ease or tightness,
and pure assents).The remainderof this section describes
ourproceduresfor codingmembers'positionsandassessing
codingreliability.
Five features of our coding proceduresare especially
importantfor ensuring the quality of the resulting data
series. First,studentsemployedas coders were requiredto
be knowledgeablein the field of monetaryeconomics,but
were not otherwise connected with the project.8Second,
coders were provided with identical written instructions
describinghow positionswere to be recognizedandcoded.
Third,all votingobservationswere independentlycoded by
at least two individuals.When coding inconsistenciesoccurred,a third coder served as a "tie breaker."The tie
breakerhadaccessto the originalsourcematerialsas well as
the explanationsfor coding decisionsprovidedby the first
two coders.All coding inconsistencieswere also reviewed
by one of the authors,who providedan alternativecoding
which overruledthe firsttie breakerin some cases. Fourth,
the reliabilityof the codingswas assessedusingmeasuresof
6 Our originalsample includedtwo observationswhere membersdissented to indicate disapprovalof the operatingprocedureratherthan
dissatisfactionwith the adoptedpolicy stance.These observationswere
omittedfromoursubsequentanalysis.
7 The chairmanservesas an agendasetterandconsensusbuilder.Further,
no chairmanhas ever cast a dissentingvote. We believe that the voting
behaviorof the chairmanis intrinsicallydifferentfrom that of other
membersandhaveexcludedhis votes fromouranalysis.
8 We employed a total of five students as coders. One coder had
completedan undergraduate
degree with an economics majorat Duke
University,andthe otherfourstudentswere enrolledin master'sor Ph.D.
programsin economicsat the Universityof NorthCarolinaat Charlotteor
theUniversityof SouthCarolina.
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consistency commonly employed in content analyses. Finally,reliabilitywas furtherassessedby a sensitivityanalysis of ourstatisticalresults.All of ourestimationshavebeen
replicatedfor four sets of codings:(1) the codingsprovided
by the first coder, (2) the codings providedby the second
coder, (3) the compositecoding providedby the first two
coders with inconsistenciesresolved by the student tie
breaker,and (4) the compositecodingswith inconsistencies
resolvedby an author.
Basic sourcematerialsfor coderswere the Memorandum
of Discussionandthe Bluebookpreparedby the boardstaff.
The Bluebook describes alternativepolicy scenariospresented for the committee to consider in a meeting. For
example,the staffmightpresentthreepolicyoptions,labeled
A, B, and C, progressingfrom easiest to tightest.For each
option, forecastrangesfor money growthand the Federal
fundsrateareprovided.Becausemembersoftencouchtheir
remarksin relationto theseoptions,it is usefulto havethem
availablewhencoding.
The Memorandum of Discussion describes both the

adopteddirectiveand members'expressedpreferences.In
our coding scheme,leaningpositionsaredefinedrelativeto
the adoptedpolicy. Membersare sometimesexplicit about
their desired funds rate ranges, which can be directly
comparedto the ranges adoptedfor the directive.When
explicitinformationwas available,coderswereinstructedto
comparethe midpointof a member's desired funds rate
rangeto the midpointof the adoptedrange,andcode leaning
positions accordingly.For example, if an assentingmember's suggested range has a midpoint of 6.0%, but the
adoptedfunds rate range midpointis 6.5%, then a "lean
favoringease" shouldbe coded.
When members do not give explicit bounds for their
desired funds rates, it is still possible to code leaning
positions.A membermight state a preferencesomewhere
betweenalternativesA andB. If B is adoptedandif A is the
"easier" scenario, then a lean favoring ease should be
coded. Similarly,a membermight argue that the adopted
policy B is acceptable,butnotethaterrorsin the directionof
ease would be preferableto those in the oppositedirection.
Such statementswould also be coded as "leans for ease."
Detailedinstructionsgiven to codersare availablefromthe
authorsuponrequest.
To have confidencein our subsequentanalyses,we must
determinewhetherthe codings producedby our procedure
are reliable. Reliability requires a reasonabledegree of
thatis, the resultsproducedfrom a content
reproducibility;
classificationshouldbe robustacrossmultiplecodingsof the
raw textual data. Our coding procedureproduced two
complete independentcodings (i.e., codings before any
tie-breaking)whichserveas one basisfor ourassessmentof
reliability.We find agreementin the assignedcategoryon
78.9%(634 out of 804) of the observations,with a correlation coefficientof 0.776 betweenthe two codings.
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Althoughpercentagreementand the correlationcoeffi- from minor correctableerrors.We believe that our final
cienthave oftenbeenreportedin contentanalyses,neitheris coding correctsmost such errors,and that relativelyfew
entirely adequate. Krippendorf(1980) has presented an positionsareinherentlydifficultto code. In ourfinalcoding
alternativemeasureof consistency,knownas Krippendorf's of members(i.e., with tie breaksresolved by the authoralpha,which has two desirableproperties.First,in contrast coder), 17 observations(2.1%) are coded as dissents for
to thepercentagreementmeasure,it adjustsforthosechance ease, 194 (24.1%) are coded as leans toward ease, 346
agreementswhichcan occureven if codingsareintrinsically (43.0%)arecodedas pureassents,217 (27.0%)arecodedas
unrelated.Second,it accountsforthe ordinalcharacterof the leans towardtightness,and 30 (3.8%)are coded as dissents
classifications.For our two independentcodings, Krippen- for tightness.
dorff'salphafor ordinaldatais 0.734, whichis interpreted
to
mean that observed agreementis 73.4% above chance.9
II. A Model of FOMC Decision Making
While there are no strict cut-off points for assessing an
acceptabledegreeof reliability,valuesin therangeof 0.67 to
This section summarizesour empiricalmodel of FOMC
0.80 areconsideredto be in a "grayarea."In suchcases, an decisionmakingandmethodsfor estimatingits parameters.
assessmentof the reliabilityof the codingshingesuponthe The modelspecifiespolicy preferencesof individualFOMC
robustnessof resultsto the use of alternativesets of codings members in the form of desired interest rate reaction
in the substantiveanalysis(Krippendorff
(1980, p. 147)).We functionsandprovideslinks betweenthose preferencesand
undertakesuchan assessmentin sectionIII.
ultimatepolicy outcomes.11A key featureof the model is
While consistency of codings is an importantissue, that parametersof individualFOMC members'monetary
correctnessof the codings is even moreimportant.Matters policy reactionfunctionsare estimable,even thoughmemof judgmentclearlyaccountedfor manyof the discrepancies bers'desiredpolicy settingsareunobserved.
in our two originalcodings, but it is also clear that many
The descriptionof the model providedhere is skeletal;
discrepanciesresultedfromerrorsin the properapplication extensivediscussionsof similarmodelsandmethodscan be
of coding procedures.For example,in coding positionsfor found in Chappell et al. (1993, 1995). In addition, a
the April 7, 1970, FOMC meeting, one coder incorrectly completedescriptionof the model and estimationmethods
recordedthe rangefor the Federalfundsrateadoptedby the can be obtained in a working paper available from the
committee.Since all individualsare coded relative to the authorsuponrequest.
adopteddirective,such an errorcan affect the coding for
each memberpresent.In this particularcase, nine coding
discrepanciesresultedfrom a single, easily identifiederror. A. Individuals'ReactionFunctions
An importantfunctionof our tie breakeris to detect and
We begin with equation (1), which specifies desired
correctcodingerrorsthathaveresultedin discrepancies.
interestratereactionfunctionsforN membersof theFOMC:
Because our coders were instructedto explain their
decisions, it is usually possible to distinguisherrorsfrom
J
K
differing judgments. To help in the assessment of data
+
O
+
(1)
t=
0tkDkit
a jXjt + eit,
reliability the author-codercategorized all discrepancies
k=1
j=l
either as "coding errors" or as "coding ambiguities."
i= 1, . .. , N; t = 1, ... ., T.
Coding errorsoccur when an inconsistencyresults from
factual errors or misapplicationsof coding procedures. The dependentvariabler*tis memberi's desired Federal
Codingambiguitiesoccur when the originalsourcemateri- funds ratefor the intermeetingperiodfollowing meetingt.
als are vague, contradictory,or inconclusiveregardingan Members'desiredfundsratesare not directlyobservable.'2
individual'sposition, or when coding instructionsfail to The reaction functions include two sets of independent
cover specialcircumstancesin a meeting.The author-coder variables,Xjt,j = 1, ... , J, andDkit, k = 1, ... , K. Included
classified 173 mismatchingobservations,findinga total of amongthe Xjtare macroeconomicindicatorsof concernto
122 errorsand51 ambiguities.10
Of these 173 discrepancies, the Fed, for example, forecastsof inflationor unemploy135 were resolved satisfactorilyby the tie breaker,and 38 ment.Thesevariablesareassumedto varyover time butnot
werereversedby the author-coder.
Thuswhilethenumberof acrossmembers.The variablesincludedamongthe Dkitvary
discrepancieswas disappointing,many of them resulted acrossbothmembersandtime.In the presentanalysis,these
are dummyvariablesindicatingspecificindividualsserving
9 If codings were assignedcompletelyat random,one would expect a
value of 0 for Krippendorff's
alpha.In the case of completeagreement,
Krippendorff's
alphawouldequal 1.0. The valuesof Krippendorff's
alpha
reportedin thetextwerecomputedusinga SAS macroprovidedin Kanget
al. (1993).
10Therewere 170 discrepanciesbetweencoders 1 and 2. In threeother
cases the authoroverruledcoders 1 and 2 when they were in agreement.
The authorreviewed agreeing coders only when anotherdiscrepancy
revealedan errorwiththepotentialto affectall codingsin a meeting.

" Monetarypolicy reactionfunctionsempiricallylink a policy instruconditions.
ment,e.g., theFederalfundsrate,to prevailingmacroeconomic
A reaction function conveniently describes the implicit policy rule
followedby the centralbank.Khoury(1990) providesa recentreviewof
thereactionfunctionliterature.
12 Althoughthe Memorandasometimesindicateindividualmembers'
desiredrangesfor the Federalfundsrate,thisis notroutinelythecase.
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on the FOMC.13The inclusion of these dummyvariables C. EmpiricalSpecification
permitseach committeememberto have a differentreaction
In our empiricalmodel the variablesDkit in the reaction
functionintercept.'4In addition,errortermsfor the reaction
function
(1) aredummyvariablesfor 30 individualmembers
functions (1) are assumed to be independentlynormally
of
FOMC
the
(excludingthe chairman)who voted five or
distributedwithmeanzeroandvariancec2.
more times on the monetarypolicy directive during the
1970-1976 period.16The remainingmembersaccountedfor
B. FOMCDecision Making
a totalof just six votes andarecollectivelyrepresentedin the
In orderto estimatethe parametersof equation(1) with intercept ot0.
Economictargetvariablesincludedamongthe Xftin the
the availabledata, some additionalassumptionsabout the
policy-makingprocessare required.These assumptionsare reactionfunctionsare identicalto those used in Chappellet
al. (1993, 1995) and are typical of otherreactionfunction
describedbelow.
studies. We include the lagged Federal funds rate rt-1,
calculated
as the averageFederalfundsratebetweenmeet1. Thepolicy directives adopted by the FOMC effectively
1
ings
tand
t, to accountfor inertiain the movementof
set a target value for the Federal funds rate. During
interest
rates.
Lagged
moneygrowthMht1, calculatedas the
the 1970s the FOMCadoptedtargetsfor both money
growth
rate
of
Mi
over
the two months preceding the
growthandthe fundsrate.However,becausetherange
meeting,
is
also
included.
The
remainingeconomicvariables
of permittedfunds rates was usually narrow,the
are
three-month-ahead
of the percentagerate of
forecasts
operating procedureis best viewed as funds rate
in
the
consumer
change
index
price
targeting.15
Pt, the unemployment
rate
and
the
growth
rate
of
industrial
productionIPt.17
2. The adoptedfunds rate depends on the desired rates of
Ut,
our
model
the
Although
general
treats
chairman'svoting
committee members. We specify that the funds rate r,
as
an
estimable
in
weight
y
parameter,
practicewe have
adoptedby the committeeis a weightedaverageof the
found
that
its
estimates
are
often
andimplausible
imprecise
chairman'sdesiredrate and the mean of the desired
in
In
magnitude.18
our
subsequent
empirical
work we have
rates of all other members.The chairman'svoting
therefore
estimated
the
model
while
alternative
imposing
weight y is an estimableparameterof the model.
3. The funds rate adopted by the committee is observed
as the average rate prevailing in the postmeeting

plausible values (0.25, 0.50, 0.75) for y.19

III. Results
period. This assumptionprovides a needed link beare
tween individuals'desired policies, which
not
Table 1 presentsestimatesof the key model parameters.
observed,and the postmeetingfunds rate, which is The coefficients of economic variables in the reaction
observed.
functionswere obtainedfromordinaryleast-squares(OLS)
4. Conflicts resulting in eitherformal dissents or internal
estimationof a reduced-formequationderived from our
expressions of disagreement within FOMC meetings
model to explainthe postmeetingFederalfundsrate.With
are generated by differences in underlying policy
the exceptionof the inflationrate,signs of the coefficientsof
preferences.We model the behavior of individual economic variablesin the reactionfunctionare
consistent
membersby assuming that differencesbetween an with the
hypothesisthatthe Fed "leansagainstthe wind"in
individual's desired funds rate and the funds rate
settingits policyinstrument.However,only the laggedfunds
adoptedby the committeetriggerboth dissents and
16 The choice of five votes as the criterionfor including a dummy
leaningpositions.Specifically,if a memberprefersa
fundsratelower thanthatadoptedby the committee, variablefor a specific individualis somewhatarbitrary.However,it is
difficultto obtainreliableestimatesfor individualswho do not vote often.
and if the differencein ratesis sufficientlylarge (i.e., The
criterionof at leastfive votes seemsto offera reasonablyinclusiveand
greaterthanK1),the memberwill "lean"towardease. tractablesolution.
If the differenceis even larger(i.e., greaterthan K2), 17 The forecastsare predictedvalues from "rolling"regressionequaexplainingeachof thetargetvariables.Fordetails,see Chappellet al.
the member will dissent favoring ease. Similarly, tions,
(1993).
dissentsor leans towardtightnessaregeneratedwhen 18 Ourdataprovideevidenceon y whichis, at best, indirect.The weight
an individualprefers a higher funds rate than that of the chairmanis inferredfrom evidence on how responsivea given
is to variationsin the compositionof the remainderof the
specified in the proposed directive. The threshold member
committee.Forexample,if membersare very responsiveto variationsin
parametersK1andK2arealso estimable.
the compositionof the committee,it is inferredthat the othermembers
13 Over

an extended sample period, many specific individualswill
occupythe N positionson the committee(whenthereareno vacanciesor
absences,N = 11). In our notationalscheme, member i refers to the
arbitrarilyassignedposition numberof a member,i.e., i E II, . . , NJ.
Memberi neednotbe the samespecificindividualovertime.
14 The model could be generalizedto permit other reactionfunction
parametersto vary across members.However,it is doubtfulthat such
distinctionscanbe assessedreliablywiththe limiteddataavailable.
15See Goodfriend(1991) for a supporting
view.

have a large impacton the adopteddirective,and thatthe impactof the
chairmanmust then be relativelysmall. In the absence of more direct
evidence,it is not surprisingthaty is not satisfactorilyestimated.
19 In Chappellet al. (1993) y was estimatedto be about0.21. Alternative
estimateswere obtainedby HavrileskyandGildea(1994), who surveyed
monetarypolicy scholars to solicit their subjective estimates of y.
Respondentstypicallyreportedy values in the 0.6 to 0.8 range.When
specificallyaskedfor a y valuefor Burns,themeanresponsewas 0.73. We
are not aware of any other quantitativeassessmentsof the chairman's
power.
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TABLE 1.-MONETARY

Variable

Coefficient

-y(constrained)

0.2500

rt, I
IP
U
p
oto
BUCHER
MAISEL
SHEEHAN
MORRIS
MITCHELL
EASTBURN
HOLLAND
BALLES
MAYO
BLACK
DAANE
SHERRILL
COLDWELL
SWAN
BAUGHMAN
WINN
ROBERTSON
JACKSON
WALLICH
HICKMAN
TREIBER
BRIMMER
HEFLIN
MACLAURY
CLAY
VOLCKER
DEBS
KIMBREL
FRANCIS
HAYES
XI
X2

POLICY REACTION FUNCTIONS WITH INDIVIDUAL INTERCEPTS: ORDERED PROBIT ESTIMATES

StandardError

Coefficient

Standard Error

0.5000

0.7337
0.0143
0.0191
-0.9321
-0.0703

0.0886
0.0131
0.0204
0.2083
0.0564

7.4019
-1.1811
-1.1904
-0.9407
-0.7626
-0.5147
-0.4716
-0.3672
-0.4122
-0.3137
-0.1923
-0.2481
-0.2024
-0.1414
0.0130
0.1125
0.0817
0.0445
0.2231
0.3086
0.2854
0.3132
0.3215
0.4153
0.4568
0.5563
0.7928
1.0937
0.9398
1.1290
1.2366
0.7242
2.4259

0.4271
0.4334
0.4219
0.4695
0.3952
0.4838
0.4244
0.4870
0.4173
0.4526
0.4034
0.4518
0.4545
0.5022
0.4307
0.4131
0.4268
0.4754
0.4589
0.5391
0.5901
0.4179
0.4541
0.4228
0.4551
0.5285
0.5489
0.4412
0.5357
0.4111
0.0331
0.0796

7.4207
-0.9166
-0.8718
-0.7378
-0.6071
-0.4474
-0.4116
-0.3897
-0.3843
-0.3100
-0.2774
-0.2349
-0.2166
-0.1975
-0.0777
-0.0643
-0.0433
-0.0279
0.0483
0.0669
0.0897
0.1367
0.1490
0.2079
0.2181
0.2824
0.4471
0.5165
0.5303
0.6766
0.7554
0.4919
1.6479

Coefficient

StandardError

0.7500

0.2687
0.2711
0.2635
0.2979
0.2461
0.3137
0.2697
0.3114
0.2634
0.2844
0.2508
0.2832
0.2906
0.3191
0.2723
0.2597
0.2669
0.3136
0.2953
0.3461
0.3861
0.2593
0.2823
0.2679
0.2891
0.3489
0.3360
0.2795
0.3460
0.2566
0.0225
0.0540

7.4587
-0.7610
-0.7083
-0.6164
-0.5152
-0.4011
-0.3656
-0.3811
-0.3499
-0.2946
-0.3039
-0.2236
-0.2308
-0.2102
-0.1304
-0.1320
-0.0941
-0.0642
-0.0267
-0.0388
-0.0187
0.0471
0.0638
0.0900
0.1098
0.1488
0.2839
0.2466
0.3265
0.4464
0.5140
0.3714
1.2446

0.1897
0.1912
0.1849
0.2115
0.1727
0.2273
0.1931
0.2239
0.1871
0.2000
0.1756
0.1998
0.2081
0.2273
0.1941
0.1840
0.1879
0.2320
0.2134
0.2481
0.2857
0.1807
0.1984
0.1911
0.2064
0.2579
0.2335
0.1995
0.2489
0.1802
0.0170
0.0406

Correlationsof coefficientsof individual-specificdummyvariables
y = 0.25
y = 0.50
y = 0.75

-y = 0.25

-y = 0.50

-y = 0.75

1.0000

0.9972
1.0000

0.9913
0.9983
1.0000

rate and the unemploymentrate are significantlydifferent
fromzero at the 0.05 level.
The parametersdescribingdifferencesacrossindividuals
have been obtainedfrom the estimationof a reduced-form
five-categoryorderedprobitmodel, againderivedfromour
behavioralmodel, explainingmembers'coded policy positions. All of the estimatespresentedin table 1 employ our
final set of codingsin which decisionsregardingdiscrepancies were reviewedby an author-coder.
The resultsprovide
evidenceof considerablediversityacrossmembers,despite
the infrequencyof formaldissents.We initiallyfocus on the
estimationin which the chairman'sweight y is set equalto
0.50. In table 1, members are listed by intercepts in
ascending order (i.e., from easy to tight) in the center
column, correspondingto y = 0.50. Extremesare repre-

sentedby GovernorJeffreyBucherand New YorkFederal
Reserve Bank presidentAlfred Hayes. Other things held
equal, desiredfunds rates for Hayes and Bucherdifferby
1.67 percentagepoints, with Bucher preferringthe easier
stance. Statisticallysignificantdifferencesbetween memberscanbe detectedin manycases. Forexample,Waldtests
(not reported)revealthatBucher'sinterceptis significantly
lower (at the 0.01 level or better)than those of 24 other
members.GovernorJ. L. Robertson,whose interceptranks
him near the median for the group, has an intercept
significantlyhigherthanfive othersand significantlylower
thanthreeothers.
Whenalternativevaluesareimposedfor y, the chairman's
votingweight,resultsaresimilarin mostrespects.However,
the varianceof the reduced-formprobitmodel errorterm

MONETARYPOLICY PREFERENCESOF INDIVIDUAL FOMC MEMBERS
TABLE 2.-SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS: COEFFICIENT ESTIMATES OBTAINED
FROM ALTERNATIVE CODINGS

Variable
-y(constrained)
OLO

BUCHER
MAISEL
SHEEHAN
MORRIS
MITCHELL
EASTBURN
HOLLAND
BALLES
MAYO
BLACK
DAANE
SHERRILL
COLDWELL
SWAN
BAUGHMAN
WINN
ROBERTSON
JACKSON
WALLICH
HICKMAN
TREIBER
BRIMMER
HEFLIN
MACLAURY
CLAY
VOLCKER
DEBS
KIMBREL
FRANCIS
HAYES
XI
X2

Tie Broken

Overruled

0.5000

0.5000

0.5000

7.4380
-0.9198
-0.7837
-0.7006
-0.5705
-0.3021
-0.4474
-0.3554
-0.3234
-0.2494
-0.2790
-0.2384
-0.2860
-0.1933
-0.0755
-0.1310
-0.0507
-0.1566
0.1944
0.0731
-0.0261
0.1170
0.1311
0.2102
0.2193
0.3229
0.0938
0.4919
0.5262
0.7088
0.7256
0.4865
1.6338

7.4232
-0.9478
-0.9267
-0.7427
-0.5792
-0.3771
-0.5020
-0.3876
-0.3834
-0.4169
-0.2879
-0.2909
-0.2410
-0.2014
-0.0916
-0.0526
-0.0582
-0.0195
0.1868
0.0663
-0.0378
0.3009
0.1511
0.1923
0.1269
0.2677
0.3467
0.5157
0.5537
0.6763
0.7633
0.4871
1.6558

7.4207
-0.9165
-0.8718
-0.7378
-0.6071
-0.4474
-0.4116
-0.3897
-0.3843
-0.3100
-0.2774
-0.2349
-0.2166
-0.1975
-0.0777
-0.0643
-0.0433
-0.0279
0.0483
0.0669
0.0897
0.1367
0.1490
0.2079
0.2181
0.2824
0.4471
0.5165
0.5303
0.6766
0.7554
0.4919
1.6479

Coder 1

Coder2

0.5000
7.3331
-0.6326
-0.7265
-0.5887
-0.4096
-0.2589
-0.2604
-0.0595
-0.1616
-0.2247
-0.0478
0.0541
-0.0326
-0.0894
0.1169
0.0994
0.2178
0.1452
0.1969
0.2655
0.2669
0.1355
0.2630
0.2168
0.3210
0.4434
0.3308
0.7065
0.5639
0.9187
0.8677
0.4985
1.6234

Correlationsof coefficientsof individual-specificdummyvariables

Coder 1
Coder2
Tie broken
Overruled

Coder 1

Coder 2

1.0000

0.9715
1.0000

Tie Broken
0.9687
0.9829
1.0000

Overruled
0.9773
0.9787
0.9900
1.0000

despitea numberof discrepanciesacrosscoders,including
manycorrectableerrors,ourfindingsappearto be robust.
Froma methodologicalperspectivewe arealso interested
in how the availability of data on "leaning" positions
improves our ability to accuratelycharacterizemembers'
preferences.To make such an assessment,we recoded all
leaningpositionsas pureassents,thus discardingthe informationobtainedfromthe Memoranda.Wethenemployeda
three-categoryorderedprobitmodelto estimatethe parameters of the originalmodel (exceptingK1,the thresholdfor
leans). Results (not reported)showed that coefficientstandarderrorsaretypicallyinflatedby about50%in the results
based on the three-categoryprobitmodel. Tests of differences between members also revealed fewer significant
differences.Forexample,Bucherdifferedsignificantlyfrom
only 21 othermembers(at the 0.01 level), whereasRobertson differedsignificantlyfromjust four.Evidently,datafrom
the Memorandado permitmore refineddistinctionsto be
madeacrossmembers.
Members'interceptrankingsweregenerallysimilarin the
three-categoryand five-categoryestimations.The correlation coefficient for the two sets of estimates was 0.86,
indicatingconsiderableconsistencybetweenvoting behavior and coded leans, yet not so much consistencythat the
dataon leans could be consideredredundant.For example,
estimatesfrom the three-categoryprobitmodel suggested
that Henry Wallich was one of the more ease-oriented
FOMCmembers(his only dissentin 25 votes was in favorof
ease), whereas estimatesmakinguse of the five-category
classificationsuggestedthe reverse(he leanedfor tightness
12 timesandfor ease only five times).In the yearsfollowing
1976,Wallichconsistentlyfavoredtighterpoliciesthanmost
of his colleagues,a behavioralpatternwhich is predictable
basedon ourestimatesusing datafromthe Memoranda,but
notpredictablefromhis priorvotingrecord.
IV.

dependson -y, and this affects the scaling of otherparameters.Forexample,as y variesfrom0.25 to 0.75, the dissent
thresholdparameterX2variesfrom 2.40 to 1.24. Nevertheless, inferencesaboutmembers'relativepreferencesfor ease
versus tightnessare quite robust.Pairwisecorrelationsfor
the threesets of coefficientsin table 1 areall above0.99.
We now returnto the issue of reliabilityof ourqualitative
data.A key attributeof codingreliabilityis thatindependent
codings should produce similar substantiveconclusions.
Table 2 addressesthis concern. In this table we report
estimatesbased on four sets of codings: (1) coder 1, (2)
coder 2, (3) coders 1 and 2 with discrepanciesresolvedby
the tie breaker,and(4) coders 1, 2, andthe tie breaker,with
overrulesprovidedby an author-coder.In each case y has
been set equalto 0.50. Resultsacrossthe four columnsare
remarkablysimilar.Pairwisecorrelationsof the coefficients
dummyvariablesareabove0.96 in all
on individual-specific
cases, and rankingsof membersare nearlyidentical.Thus
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Conclusions

Dissentvotingdatahavepreviouslybeenemployedto test
a variety of propositionsabout the behaviorof different
groupsof FOMCmembers.In thispaperwe haveintroduced
a new set of data on individuals'monetarypolicy preferences that have been extractedfrom the FOMC'sMemoranda of Discussion. We find that use of the new data
permitsnotablygreaterprecisionin estimatingparameters
of individualFOMCmembers'reactionfunctions.We also
find that independentcodings of the members' leaning
positions revealed in the Memoranda of Discussion are able

to captureaspectsof individuals'policy preferenceswhich
are not evidentin voting dataalone. Specifically,estimates
of members'reactionfunctionparametersare robustacross
dataproducedby independentcodings of the Memoranda,
but in some cases, the estimatesare notablydifferentfrom
thoseobtainedwhenonly votingdataareused.
In early 1995 the FOMC voted to continue providing
edited transcriptsof its meetings to the public (after a
five-yearwaitingperiod),assuringresearchersof anongoing
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"The RelativeImportanceof the Chairmanin FOMCDeliberasource of data describingpolicy preferencesof individual
tions,"
paper(1994).
committee members. Our analysis shows that a careful Holsti, Ole R.,working
Content Analysis for the Social Sciences and Humanities
coding of these records should be valuable in future
(Reading,MA:Addison-Wesley,1969).
Kang,Namjun,Ali Kara,H. A. Laskey,andF. B. Seaton,"A SAS Macro
investigationsof FOMCdecisionmaking.
for CalculatingIntercoderAgreementin ContentAnalysis,"Jour-
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